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Preface 
Abstract 
The Nordic countries score high on most measures of economic and social performance. 
Centralised bargaining giving a compressed wage structure across firms has been 
proposed as a key source to this success. A paper by Douglas Hibbs and Håkan Locking 
from 2000 seems to be the only empirical investigation of this link and it provides results 
which support the theory. However, those results do not pass some key robustness 
checks. First, a test for weak instruments cannot reject that the instrumentation in one 
specification is too weak. Second, a test for a stable long term relationship cannot reject 
that the variables do not cointegrate. These findings point to caution when using the 
conclusions of Hibbs and Locking as empirical support of a link between inter-firm wage 
compression and positive economic outcomes. It is not in any way, however, evidence 
against the validity of such a theory. 
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1 Introduction 
 
All of the five Nordic countries score high on various global rankings of economic and 
social performance. They hold three of the top 10 positions on UNDP’s 2006 ranking of 
human development, three of the top 10 positions of the World Economic Forum’s 
2007/08 ranking of Global Competitiveness and three of the top 10 levels of PPP per 
capita GDP in 2006. The discussion of what lessons to draw from these countries is 
natural, and it becomes central to discuss what the key determinants of the social and 
economic outcomes we observe in the Nordic countries today may have been. Among a 
host of theoretically plausible explanations put forward, most surveyed in Moene and 
Wallerstein (2006), we find the importance of proactive economic planning (Bjerkholt 
2005), social homogeneity (Alesina et al 2001), focus on social equality rather than social 
stability (Pontusson 2006), and solidaristic wage bargaining (Moene and Wallerstein 
1997). All of these approaches point to mechanisms linking something which is thought 
to be relatively unique in the region to their economic and social performance. For the 
discussion to move forward, empirical work is needed. 
 
This paper is centered on evaluating the robustness of the reported efficiency-
implications of solidaristic wage bargaining on data from Sweden in one particular 
journal article. The paper ―Wage Dispersion and Productive Efficiency: Evidence for 
Sweden‖ by Douglas Hibbs and Håkan Locking from 2000 appears to be the only paper 
empirically testing the association between wage structure and economic performance in 
the Nordic countries
1
. It is used as empirical support when Moene and Wallerstein (2006, 
153-54) argue that the ―key social democratic innovation in the 1930s‖ was the move to a 
centralisation of wage bargaining which gave political stability, kept wage growth low 
and gave a more compressed wage structure. They refer to Hibbs and Locking (2000b) 
for empirical support primarily for the link between solidaristic bargaining and 
compression of the wage structure. However, they also write about its impact on 
efficiency:  
                                                 
1
 Based on searching economic journals and on conversations with Professor Karl Ove Moene, Department 
of Economics at the University of Oslo. 
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―a study of productivity growth in Sweden by Hibbs and Locking (2000) finds evidence that the 
gain in efficiency [from solidaristic bargaining] was substantial‖ (p. 155) 
 
We see that the Hibbs and Locking (2000b) paper is referred to as empirical support for 
one candidate explanation of the Nordic success. In that light it is of interest to 
investigate further the robustness of that empirical result. 
 
In the following I first show that there are theoretically sound arguments for whay wage 
compression may affect both productivity and aggregate output positively, before I argue 
that theoretically this association is of an essentially long term nature. I then turn to re-
estimating and extending on the regressions presented in Hibbs and Locking (2000b) 
using their original data. First, by using formal tests of instrumental variable strength, I 
show that data do not seem to support the validity of an instrumentation which is 
essential for one of the regression models used in the paper. I conclude that since one 
cannot reject that an endogeneity bias may still remain after the instrumentation, a re-
specification rather than further interpretation of the results is called for. Second, I turn to 
a different specification used by Hibbs and Locking (2000b) which does not have the 
same endogeneity bias. Here I argue that when testing a relationship which from theory is 
predicted to be of a long term nature, the econometric test should reflect this by looking 
for long run stable relationships among the variables. Moreover, regressions of non-
stationary time-series variables may give rise to spurious results. I investigate the time-
series properties of the variables involved and then test for such a long term stable 
relationship by testing for cointegration. I find that data does not seem to support a 
rejection that no such long term relationship exists. I conclude that these econometric 
exercises point towards being cautious when using the results reported by Hibbs and 
Locking (2000b) as empirical support for a positive impact of wage compression on 
productivity and output. 
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2 Theoretical framework 
 
In this section I will present one theoretical framework which links wage compression 
and growth. The purpose is first to legitimize the empirical work which is being done on 
identifying such a link in economic history, and second to emphasize that the theoretical 
link is of a long term nature. In particular, I focus on the theory presented by Moene and 
Wallerstein (1997) which is presented by Hibbs and Locking (2000b, 768) as one of the 
motivating models behind their empirical investigation.  
 
Low pay inequality may act as a tax on low productivity firms and a subsidy to high 
productivity firms, thus contributing to a structural change giving higher average 
productivity and potentially higher aggregate output. This line of reasoning was first 
outlined by the Swedish trade union economists Rehn and Meidner (Rehn 1952), and 
later formalised by Agell and Lommerud (1993) and by Moene and Wallerstein (1997). I 
will focus on the latter presentation, giving a consistent story of how wage structure may 
be linked to output and productivity in an economy on a steady state growth path. 
 
Moene and Wallerstein (1997) fix their ideas by comparing two bargaining regimes – 
centralised and decentralised. They maintain that labour’s bargaining power,  , is 
independent of the bargaining regime, for instance it can be held to be a function of the 
discount rate of the bargaining parties, a standard result from an alternating offer 
bargaining model. Under centralised bargaining this bargaining power is used to secure 
all workers a share   of average productivity )0(p . Under decentralised bargaining the 
result is that workers receive a share   of their own firm’s productivity 0p . In both cases 
labour prefers the market clearing wage r0 if the outcome of wage bargaining is below 
this level. The consequence is that if   is sufficiently low, centralised bargaining 
coinsides with a free market solution with homogeneous labour, while under 
decentralised bargaining, the workers at the firms with the lowest productivity receives 
the market clearing wage, while workers at more productive firms receives a share   of 
their own firm’s productivity 0p . 
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The proposition put forward by Moene and Wallerstein (1997) is that when all firms, 
regardless of the productivity of their equipment, pay the same wage, this will generate a 
lower retirement age of capital equipment. This will raise the average productivity of all 
firms in operation. As described below, the number of firms in operation may, however, 
be lower under centralised bargaining as compared to a decentralised regime, giving rise 
to unemployment. So while increased productivity will unambiguously push aggregate 
output up, any reduction in the number of firms will push aggregate output down. 
Whether the net effect is positive or negative depends on the bargaining power of labour. 
The model maintains a fixed capital-labour ratio, so that the productivity of the firm 
translates directly into the productivity of the workers. This scenario is compared with the 
profit sharing which results from decentralised bargaining. 
 
The mechanism proposed is captured by the two conditions dictating the entry and the 
exit of firms. The model type is one of vintage technology, as e.g. outlined in Johansen 
(1959, 1967) where existing capital goods keep their technological properties, while new 
technology is embedded in new investments. The productivity of new investments grows 
at a fixed exogenous growth rate, and the overall productivity level at any point in time is 
a function of the rate at which old equipment is replaced by new. Aggregate output 
depends not only on average productivity, but also on whether the regime induces full 
resource utilisation. In steady state real wages grow at the same pace as productivity.  
 
The different outcomes under centralised bargaining with a compressed wage structure 
and under decentralised bargaining with high variation in wages across firms is illustrated 
in part by Figure 1 below. Since the productivity of new capital increases at a fixed rate, 
older firms will always be less productive relative to younger firms. At any given time, 
the youngest firms have the highest productivity 0p . Workers with decentralised 
bargaining will receive their share of this value added, 0p . Firms still in operation have 
a productivity decreasing in their age, and at age   the wage 0p  falls below r0 which is 
the wage workers at older plants then prefer. At plants aged 
D  productivity is lower  
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than this market clearing wage, and the plant goes out of production. Workers with 
centralised bargaining on the other hand receive a uniform wage )0(p  resulting in lower 
wage in high productivity firms and higher wage in low productivity firms. The higher 
minimum wage results in a younger retirement age for firms, 
C . With low , C will 
approach but never exceed
D . The younger (or equally old) capital stock under 
centralised bargaining is what gives an unambiguous theoretical prediction of higher (or 
equal) productivity of the firms still in operation with low wage inequality across firms. 
 
While the exit condition gives an unambiguous prediction about productivity, the effect 
on total output is ambiguous and depends on investment, as illustrated by Figure 2 below. 
The figure shows how the net present value (NPV) of an investment at a given time is a 
 
Figure 1. Firm productivity and wages under centralised and decentralised bargaining. Source: 
Moene and Wallerstein (1997, 415). 
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function of labour’s bargaining power , but that the functional form depends on whether 
there is centralised or decentralised bargaining. As long as bargaining power on the 
horizontal axis is weak, the market clearing wage rules and is equal across firms and 
negotiation regimes. Investment costs are increasing in the number of investments each 
year, so a lower NPV will give fewer new investments each year in steady state. With 
decentralised bargaining, a relatively weak bargaining power may be enough to give 
higher wage in the most productive firms, but this will still be too low bargaining power 
for a collective agreement to give wages above the market clearing level. Consequently 
the wage costs start to rise and the NPV starts to fall, at lower level of   under 
decentralised than under centralised bargaining. Thus, there is at least an interval of α 
where NPV is higher for centralised than for decentralised bargaining and where the 
centralised regime will give investments in more firms each year, and a younger retirment 
age of capital. At a given   however, also collective bargaining starts to bite, and NPV 
starts falling rapidly. NPV falls to zero as α approaches 1, and in the model of Moene and 
Wallerstein (1997) this happens at a different rate for the two regimes making the two 
lines cross, at 
* . At one point before this bargaining power, the increased average 
productivity from a younger capital stock does no longer offeset the reduced output 
caused by the reduced number of new firms entering each year, giving lower aggregate 
output than under a decentralised bargaining regime. 
This reasoning is the background for Moene and Wallerstein’s (1997, 416) Proposition 1: 
―If α is greater than but sufficiently close to 00 / pr , centralized bargaining results in (a) lower 
employment, (b) greater investment, and (c) greater output than decentralized bargaining. If α is 
sufficiently close to one, centralized bargaining results in (a) lower employment, (b) lower 
investment, and (c) lower output than decentralized bargaining.‖ 
 
Also they write (ibid, 417) 
 
―... centralized bargaining is always as good as or better than decentralized bargaining in terms of 
output per employed worker since local bargaining increases while centralized bargaining reduced 
the average age of plants in operation.‖ 
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From this discussion some testable implications relevant for this thesis can be derived: 
I. We expect that with more wage compression we will observe unchanged or 
higher output per employed worker (productivity) 
II. Under an additional assumption of α being lower than a level above, but 
sufficiently close to 00 / pr , the theory predicts that with more wage compression 
we will also observe similar or higher output 
 
We see that implication (I) needs fewer assumptions, and should be preferred when trying 
to identify a relationship. As we will see later, however, the econometric specifications of 
(I) quickly run into endogeneity problems, making it relevant to turn to (II) for 
indications of the effect. 
 
 
Figure 2. Net present value of investment (vertical axis) as a function of worker’s bargaining 
power (horizontal) under centralised and decentralised bargaining.  
Source: Moene and Wallerstein (1997, 416). 
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The model is of a steady state economy, and thus all these implications are expected to be 
valid in the long run. This involves that the predictions about the maximum age of plants 
under different bargaining regime as well as the number of new firms being set up each 
period are stable over time, while real wages grow at the same pace as productivity 
(Moene and Wallerstein 1997, 408). The long term nature can be substantiated in at least 
two ways. First, the effect running from wage structure to economic performance runs 
through changes in the capital stock. The capital stock is accumulated over time, and any 
change is bound to be gradual. Consequently, even if the change in wage structure could 
occur over night, the impact which comes from its effect on the composition of the 
capital stock will only start to emerge after several years.  
 
Second, the long term nature of this relationship also makes sense when considering that 
the wage structures which are driving the results are the outcomes of institutional 
arrangements. There is a large literature on institutions pointing not only to their 
importance in determining economic outcomes (e.g. North 1990, Rodrik et al 2004), but 
also to how they change very slowly and tend to be very consistent over time (e.g. 
Engerman and Sokoloff 1997, Acemoglu et al 2001). For example, Acemoglu et al 
(2001), present empirical material which substantiates that various measures of 
institutional quality around 1900 have high explanatory power in predicting current 
institutional quality. When regressing separately ―Constraint on executive in 1900‖, 
―Democracy in 1900‖ and ―Constraint on executive in first years of independence‖ on 
their preferred measure of contemporary institutional quality ―Average protection against 
expropriation risk 1985-1995‖, they get significant and positive coefficients with R2 
between 0.19 and 0.25 (Acemoglu et al 2001, 1385). This illustrates how empirical 
research supports the intuition that institutions change slowly. Consequently, any variable 
which is a function of an institution is likely to exhibit a similarly ―sticky‖ nature. This 
gives further reason to believe that the effects running from particular bargaining 
institutions to economic performance are long term ones. 
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3 Empirical results 
 
In this section I re-estimate and extend on the results from regressions presented by Hibbs 
and Locking (2000b). They use a unique dataset on Swedish wage inequality and 
economic performance to test hypotheses of the effect of wage structure on productivity 
and total value added in the manufacturing sector. They give a thorough presentation of 
the evolution of manufacturing wage bargaining in Sweden since the late 1950s and 
present descriptive statistics on the associated wage structure and economic performance 
in the manufacturing sector. They point to how wage differentials fell substantially from 
the 1960s to the late 1970s, and remained rather stable thereafter. Towards the end of the 
article they summarise some regressions of wage inequality on productivity and value 
added respectively, controlling for relevant variables derived from a Cobb-Douglas 
production function. The regressions give some support to the hypothesis that the 
observed wage compression across firms affected economic performance positively.  
 
In what follows I will do some robustness checks on these results. In the working paper 
version (Hibbs and Locking 2000a) as well as in the initial version (Locking 1996) the 
authors show that the results are rather robust to the specific sample of years by repeating 
the regression on various subsamples. Also, they report that the qualitative conclusions 
were not changed by allowing for different specification of the production function 
(Hibbs and Locking 2000a, 20). However, the results are not accompanied by discussions 
of the robustness of a key instrumentation in one of the specifications, nor any explicit 
tests of whether the statistically significant covariation of contemporaneous variables 
observed is the result of stable long term relations. It is on these two points that I want to 
extend on the analysis presented in Hibbs and Locking (2000b). As will become clear 
below, once taking these additional factors into account, the data does not seem to 
support the rejection of a hypothesis of no effect from wage structure on economic 
performance. 
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3.1 Data 
 
I have the original data used in Hibbs and Locking (2000b) for their estimations
2
. They 
use two different data sets – one with values derived from firm level running from 1972 
to 1993 and one with values derived from the level of industrial sectors running from 
1963 to 1993.  
 
I have chosen to only focus on the results they get using the second data set, out of time 
constraints, but also due to the small size of the first set. It has only 22 datapoints, one of 
which is lost when using lagged values in instrumentation, leaving us with 21 
observations. Using between 12 and 6 explanatory variables this leaves us with only 9 to 
15 degrees of freedom when trying to identify a systematic relationship between the 
variables in the time-series.  
 
The data set for the 1963-1993 time series is compiled by Hibbs and Locking based on 
data from various sources.  
- Value added, labour, real capital stock, capital utilisation, nominal wages, 
payroll tax, and producer price index: For these time series the source was 
Statistics Sweden. All variables are for the areas Manufacturing and Mining 
which are categories 2 and 3 in the ISIC classification.  
- Pay inequality between sectors and within sectors: Data on pay dispersion is 
based on individual wages for workers covered by the general agreements 
between the Swedish Trade Union Confederation ―LO‖ and ―Svenska 
Arbetsgivareföreningen‖, the predecessor to The Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv). This roughly corresponds to the ISIC categories 
2 and 3 above, although Hibbs and Locking note that the construction sector is 
left out of the calculations owing to the lack of data on individual wages. The 
                                                 
2
 Thanks to Håkan Locking for providing me with this dataset, and for being so forthcoming in this process. 
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measure of dispersion is the squared coefficient of variation weighted by the 
employment share of each sector. 
o For the wage dispersion between contract areas, the data was provided by 
the ―Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen‖.  
o For the wage dispersion within contract areas for the period 1972-1993, 
the data was also provided by the same source, while the data points for 
1963-1971 have been estimated by Hibbs and Locking based on data from 
a more limited sample of manufacturing workers belonging to the 
engineering and fabricated metals industry (Verkstadsföreningen). 
- Real user price of capital: The estimates for the real user price of capital had 
been provided to Hibbs and Locking courtesy of Professor Jan Södersten at 
Uppsala University and cover the years 1964-1993. 
- Total import from the OECD: The measure of total OECD import, which is used 
as an instrument in the article, was based on data from International Financial 
Statistics. 
 
Apart from OECD import which is deflated with an import deflator and adjusted for 
currency fluctuations (SEK/US dollar), all the real values are found by deflating for 
Swedish producer prices, which makes sense given that the economic mechanism which 
is investigated is driven by the choices made by the producers in the economy. Regarding 
wage-costs this implies looking at nominal wages including payroll taxes deflated by the 
producer price index. 
3.2 Specifications 
 
The specifications used by Hibbs and Locking (2000b) to test their hypotheses are 
derived from standard production functions augmented by variables measuring pay 
inequality. 
 
The authors first argue that wage inequality between sectors and within sectors may have 
distinct impacts on productivity and output. They therefore seek to include measures of 
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both in their specifications. Akerlof and Yellen (1988) and Levine (1991), although only 
focusing on the within firm inequality, pursued the same reasoning at firm level and 
proposed a production function where a function of the within firm inequality 
representing its efficiency effect entered multiplicatively with the traditional components 
of production functions. Hibbs and Locking (2000b) extend on this and hypothesise that 
aggregate production may be expressed as the product of a function of real capital and 
labour and a function representing the joint efficiency effect of both inequality measures.  
 
),,(*),( LKtFCVWCVBgY   
 
where CVB is a measure of inequality between sectors and CVW is a measure of 
inequality within sectors, t captures a deterministic trend in productivity, K is the stock of 
real capital and L is manufacturing labour. This expression allows them to treat the 
function of capital and labour and the function of the inequality measures linearly when 
the joint production function is written on log form.  
 
Since there is no theoretical consensus on how inequality affects efficiency, Hibbs and 
Locking (2000b) do not have any guidance as to the functional form of g. They therefore 
simply add the two variables to the regression model in two flexible ways. The two forms 
of the g-function which follows from the way they allow CVB and CVW to enter are 
 
21
0),(
 CVWCVBCVWCVBg   
and 
 CVWCVBCVWCVBg 210 exp),(    
as discussed in Locking (1996, 106). 
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The F-function they use is of the Cobb-Douglas form. They note that experimenting with 
more general production functions did not significantly alter their results. This leads to 
the first regression model  
 
(1)   tttt CVWCVBgLKtY   ),(ln)ln()ln()ln( 2110  
 
where  ),(ln CVWCVBg  is respectively  
 
  CVWCVBCVWCVBg lnlnln),(ln 210    
 
and 
 
  CVWCVBCVWCVBg 210ln),(ln    
 
and where Yt is real manufacturing value added using producer prices as deflator, t is the 
trend representing exogenous deterministic productivity growth, Kt is the real stock of 
capital adjusted for capital utilisation, Lt is manufacturing labour, CVBt is the squared 
coefficient of variation of wages between sectors weighed by the sectors’ share of 
employment and CVWt is the corresponding measure of pay inequality within industrial 
sectors. There is one period per year in the data. Hibbs and Locking (2000b) chose not to 
restrict the production function to exhibin constant returns to scale in K and L. 
 
When looking at the effect of changes in the g-function on productivity (Y/L), Hibbs and 
Locking (2000b) show that cost minimisation using the ―Dispersion augmented Cobb-
Douglas Production Function‖, which (1) amounts to, leaves labour as a function of 
prices (W and R) and a set level of the g-function (g(CVB,CVW)). They also introduce 
adjustment costs to changes in the labour stock, opening up for rigidity in the way the 
labour stock adjusts. This is accounted for by adding lagged labour as an explanatory 
variable. To get an expression for labour productivity they divide value added Y by this 
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augmented expression for optimal labour, and when taking the log of that expression they 
get the following specification  
 
(2) 
  ttttt
t
t CVWCVBgLYWRt
L
Y
 





 ),(ln)ln()ln()ln()ln(ln 1432110  
 
where Wt is the real wage deflated with producer prices and including payroll tax, Rt is 
the real user price of capital, and (Yt/Lt) is labour productivity and  ),(ln CVWCVBg  as 
discribed for specification (1) above. 
 
We see that ln(Yt) is endogenous in (2) and as explained in the footnote to table 4 in 
Hibbs and Locking (2000b, 773) it is instrumented by 
 
(3) ttttt uZIMPYY    )ln()ln()ln( 2110  
 
where Zt is a vector of all exogenous RHS variables in (2).  
 
In both specifications (1) and (2) Hibbs and Locking (2000b) open for several breaks in 
the deterministic trend. They justify this as following:  
 
―In view of the worldwide productivity slowdown in the 1970s, which is correlated to some 
degree with the phases of Swedish wage formation (…) we investigated the robustness of results 
to relaxation of the fixed trend assumption.‖ (p. 770) 
 
The trend-breakes are thus primarily controls for shifts in productivity growth which was 
observed worldwide. However, by letting the breakes coincide with the phases of 
Swedish wage formation, they may also capture unobservable effects running from the 
  15   
  
wage formation regimes to the dependent variables. Since theory indicates that these 
wage regimes also affect wage inequality systematically, not controlling for the wage 
regimes may give an omitted variable bias, systematically biasing the effect of wage 
inequality on the dependent variables. By including the control for the wage regimes, 
Hibbs and Locking (2000b) address this potential omitted variable bias. 
 
I now turn to a re-examination of the results yielded by the above specification, based on 
re-estimating and extending the results reported in Hibbs and Locking (2000b). I first 
look at specification (2) and its associated instrumentation before I turn to a more 
thorough investigation of specification (1). 
 
3.3 Specification (2): problematic instrumentation 
 
A necessary condition needed to ensure that specification (2) identifies the association 
between the measures of inequality and productivity, is that the endogeneity of log Value 
added, ln(Y), is satisfactory dealt with. If this is not the case, then 3 will still be biased 
making all other coefficients in (2) biased, including our coefficients of interest 1  and 
2 . This section shows that there seems to be little support in data that this necessary 
condition is met with the instrumentation used by Hibbs and Locking (2000b), as 
expressed in (3) above. 
 
Any good instrument needs to have two qualities. First, the effect of the instrument on the 
endogenous regressor, when controlling for all the other exogenous variables, must be 
statistically significant. This can be investigated by looking at the properties of the 
coefficient in a reduced form regression of the type we see in (3) above. Second, it must 
affect the dependent variable only through its effect on the endogenous regressor – it 
must be orthogonal to the error term of (2). There are no powerful tests for this, but it can 
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be evaluated through tests of over-identification as long as there is more than one 
additional instrument in (3). 
 
By using the same specification and data as Hibbs and Locking (2000b), I have 
reproduced the results from their article (Table 4, p. 773), reported below as Panel A in 
Table 1. In supplement to this I report the results from the first stage regression (Panel B) 
as well as an over-identification test of the validity of the instrumentation (Panel C). The 
fact that the two stage least square estimates I get in Panel A are identical
3
 to those of 
Hibbs and Locking indicates that what is reported in Panel B and C are the same results 
the authors of the original paper would have gotten.  
 
I now first evaluate each of the two additional instruments according to the two criterions 
mentioned above, before I turn to a formal test of whether using these instruments is 
likely to have accounted for the endogeneity bias necessary for identification.  
                                                 
3
 In the notes to this table in the working paper version Hibbs and Locking (2000a), it says that the 
coefficients have ―robust standard errors (White 1980)‖. Unfortunately, I have not managed to get identical 
standard errors to those reported by Hibbs and Locking when running robust OLS-regressions. However, 
the qualitative conclusions based on the reported t-values remain the same.  
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Table 1 
Two Stage Least Square Regressions of Log Productivity. Sweden 1964-1993. 
     
     
     
 
Normal 
inequality 
and one 
trend 
Log 
inequality 
and one 
trend 
Normal 
inequality 
and breaks 
in trend 
Log 
inequality 
and breaks 
in trend 
  (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) 
 
Panel A: Two stage least squares results 
     
Inequality between sectors -11.658**  -4.591  
 (-2.58)  (-0.88)  
Inequality within sectors 6.798***  6.025*  
 (4.31)  (2.02)  
Ln (Inequality between sectors)  -0.071  -0.060 
  (-1.42)  (-1.15) 
Ln (Inequality within sectors)  0.121**  0.120* 
  (2.51)  (2.00) 
Ln (Value added) 0.299 0.406* 0.312* 0.181 
 (1.58) (1.80) (1.81) (0.96) 
Trend 0.016*** 0.012** 0.021* 0.033** 
 (3.07) (2.27) (1.86) (2.28) 
Trend 1972-82   -0.010 -0.021 
   (-1.05) (-1.70) 
Trend 1983-93   -0.017** -0.024*** 
   (-2.29) (-3.15) 
Dummy1983-93   -0.063 -0.206 
   (-1.07) (-1.20) 
 Cobb-Douglas derived controls yes  yes yes yes 
     
Panel B: First Stage for Ln (Value added) 
     
Lagged Ln (Value added) 0.981*** 0.965*** 0.766*** 0.720*** 
 (5.65) (5.61) (3.68) (3.41) 
Ln (OECD imports) 0.035 0.037 -0.043 -0.075 
 (0.63) (0.73) (-0.57) (-0.99) 
     
R2 0.985 0.985 0.988 0.988 
Durbin Watson Statistic 1.94 1.92 2.12 2.10 
     
Panel C: Over-identification test 
     
Sargan Specification χ2-test 7.179** 9.964** 0.216 0.065 
  (0.0074) (0.0016) (0.6419) (0.7987) 
Notes: From Panel A the results on the following control variables are not reproduced: real user 
price of capital, real wage, log Value added and lagged log labour. In Panel B only results on 
additional instruments are reported. t-values in parenthesis as reported from the robust OLS 
estimation function in Stata. * significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent 
level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
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3.3.1 Lagged manufacturing value added as instrument 
 
Looking first at lagged value added as an instrument, we see that its influence on 
contemporary value added is strong both in magnitude  (1 percent increase in lagged 
value added associated with between 0.7 and 1.0 percent increase in contemporary value 
added) and in statistical significance (at the 1 percent level) in all specifications. Its 
partial R
2
, giving an indication of how much of the variation in contemporary value 
added it captures, when controlling for the other exogenous variables, is about 0.6 for 
specification (2.1) and (2.2) and about 0.4 for specification (2.3) and (2.4). This all adds 
up to concluding that lagged value added has good properties as an instrument judging by 
criterion one.  
 
Turning to criterion two of an instrumental variable, that it be orthogonal to the error term 
of the maintained regression, the initial results are more mixed. The econometric package 
Stata reports the Sargan test of exogeneity. The test statistic created is distributed by a χ2 
distribution when the instruments are independent of the error term in the maintained 
regression, meaning that if the test statistic is significantly different from zero, the test 
rejects the null hypothesis of the instruments being valid. Looking at Panel C above, we 
see that for two specifications we do get such a rejection, indicating that the 
instrumentation is not valid. When an instrumentation is not valid in this way, this 
indicates that the endogeneity of the regressor in question is not removed by the 
instrumentation. We remember that when one variable is endogenous this may bias all the 
coefficients in the estimation. In conclusion, with specification (2.1) and (2.2) we do not 
find support in data that the instrumentation was valid and further inference from the 
results may be misleading as the endogeneity bias may still remain. Specifications (2.3) 
and (2.4) on the other hand, seem at this point to be well specified and not suffering from 
the initial endogeneity bias. 
 
Taken at face value (2.3) and (2.4) do not give much support to the theory that wage 
inequality affects productivity in any systematic way, or at least that the net effect of 
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wage inequality does is statistically different from zero. While wage dispersion within 
sectors have a positive association with productivity at a level of significance of 10 
percent, wage dispersion between sectors does not enter with a statistically significant 
effect. As long as we hold that the specifications (2.3) and (2.4) do not suffer from the 
endogeneity bias, further investigation of the relationship of interest would call for 
looking into the time series properties of the variables involved and their long term 
relationship, as will be discussed in section 4.4. below. It turns out, however, that also 
specifications (2.3) and (2.4) may be problematic, as I discuss in section 4.3.3. below. 
 
3.3.2 OECD-import as instrument 
 
For the second additional instrument, total imports to the OECD-area, criterion one of a 
good instrument is not met. Although it makes sense theoretically to use OECD-import as 
an exogenous source of variation in contemporaneous manufacturing value added, there 
is not much correlation in the data material. For concreteness, in specification (2.1) all we 
see from data is that, when controlling for other variables, a 1 percent increase in OECD-
import is associated with between 0.08 percent less and 0.15 percent more manufacturing 
value added, which is the 95 percent confidence interval. This lack of any statistically 
significant relationship is true for all specifications (2.1) through (2.4), which indicate 
that OECD-import is a weak instrument in this data sample.  
 
The weakness can be illustrated by a partial regression plot
4
 (Figure 3) showing the 
partial effect of OECD-import in the first stage regression of specification (2.1). This 
plots two errors against each other, the vertical axis is the error term from regressing the 
exogenous variables except OECD-import on manufacturing value added (denoted 
respectively imp_ln and y_ln in the graph), while the horizontal axis is the error term 
from regressing the exogenous variables on OECD-import. The Frisch-Waugh Theorem 
shows that the association between these two errors is exactly the partial contribution of  
                                                 
4
 Generated in Stata with the function ‖avplot‖ 
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Figure 3. Partial regression plot of log OECD import, denoted imp_ln, on log Value added,  
denoted y_ln,  with specification (2.1) 
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Figure 4. Partial regression plot of lagged log Value added, denoted y_ln_1,   
on log Value added , denoted y_ln, with specification (2.1) 
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OECD-import were it included in the initial regression on manufacturing value added. 
We therefore recognize the statistics quoted at the bottom of the figure as those presented 
in Panel B of Table 1 above. This pattern gives us a visual indication to doubt that there 
is any additional explanatory power in OECD-import when explaining manufacturing 
value added. For comparison the same plot is provided using the much stronger 
instrument lagged manufacturing value added (Figure 4). 
 
To sum up, we find that OECD-import is a weak instrument for manufacturing value 
added, and data does not give support for saying that criterion one of a good instrument is 
fulfilled. As I will now turn to discuss, there may have been a cost of including such a 
weak instrument in the specification. 
 
3.3.3 The instrumentation is weak and endogeneity may remain 
 
The consequence on the results of Hibbs and Locking (2000b) of including a weak 
instrument may theoretically have led to deteriorating the consistency of the their 2SLS 
estimates. For finite samples, the more instruments you use, the closer is the estimated 
regressor to the original one, and the less of the original bias of the OLS-estimator has 
been removed. On the other hand, if the additional instrument adds much to predicting 
the variation in the endogenous regressor, that improves the consistency of the 2SLS-
estimate. This trade-off is described in Murray (2006). A rule of thumb is that 
instrumentation is ―weak‖ if the first stage F statistic of excluding the additional 
instruments is below 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997). These F statistics are given below in 
Table 2, and indicate that specification (2.3) and (2.4) have weak instruments. It was for 
these two specifications that the validity of the instruments was not rejected by the 
Sargan-test. Consequently, we are now left with doubt about the endogeneity bias of all 
specifications (2.1) through (2.4).  
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The literature on formal tests for the strength of instruments as reviewed in Stock and 
Yogo (2001[2004], 4-5) has had many contributions since the article by Hibbs and 
Locking was published in 2000 and especially since its initial version was published as 
Locking (1996). One such test is provided by Stock and Yogo (2001[2004]), and 
applying it to specification (2) of Hibbs and Locking gives further indication of the 
weakness not only of (2.3) and (2.4) as the rule of thumb did, but also of (2.1) and (2.2), 
as the Sargan test did.  
 
The test looks at the chance of wrongfully rejecting a given null-hypothesis about the 
endogenous regressor. It compares the real rate of wrongfully rejecting a null hypothesis 
on the endogenous regressor, the size of the test, with the rejection rate expected from 
running the test on an exogenous regressor which is the significance level of the test. The 
closer the size is to the significance level, the stronger is the instrument set. This 
difference between the level of significance of the test and the size of the test is reduced 
as the instrument gets stronger. This motivates the definition of a strong instrument in 
this specific test. Here an instrument is defined as strong when the size of a Wald test on 
the endogenous regressor with a 5 percent level of significance is below a certain 
threshold of r. If we can test whether the size is below such a threshold, we have a way to 
determine if our instrument is weak or strong. Such a test is exactly what Stock and Yogo 
(2001[2004]) provide.  
 
The test statistic is the F statistic of excluding the additional instruments in the first stage 
of the 2SLS method. The null hypothesis of the test is that the instrument set is weak. The 
critical values are calculated so that they give rejection if the instrumentation gives a size 
of the 5-percent Wald test above r. For instance, with 2 additional instruments and one 
endogenous regressor, an F statistic above 19,93 indicates that a 5-percent Wald test may 
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wrongfully reject the null-hypothesis we put up with more than r=10 percent probability. 
In that case, we may say that the instrumentation of the endogenous variable was ―weak‖.  
 
Table 2 provides the relevant F statistics and critical values for the specifications (2.1) – 
(2.4). The results show that none of the specifications have an instrument strength 
ensuring r < 10 percent, while only (2.1) and (2.2) ensure r < 15 percent. If we, as the 
Stock and Yogo test does, base the evaluation of instrument strength on the maximum 
size of a Wald test we would accept, the above results give little support for the strength 
of the instruments. The least problem is found with specifications (2.1) and (2.2) which 
are also the specifications which give the most confirmative conclusion of the positive 
link between inter-industry wage compression and labour productivity. On the other 
hand, for thise specifications the Sargan test reported in Table 2, did not give support for 
the validity of the instrumentation. In conclusion there is reason to doubt whether the 
instrumentation is efficient enough to deal with the endogeneity bias of manufacturing 
value added as explanatory variable.  
 
 
Table 2 
Strength of instrumentation of Ln (Value added) for  
various versions of specification (2) 
        
    
Critical values for weak instrument test 
based on 2SLS size. Significance level 5 % 
Regression 
Test-
statistic 
# additional 
instruments  r = 10 r = 15 r = 20 r = 25 
        
(2.1) 15,94 2  19,93 11,59 8,75 7,25 
(2.2) 16,02 2  19,93 11,59 8,75 7,25 
(2.3) 7,42 2  19,93 11,59 8,75 7,25 
(2.4) 7,89 2  19,93 11,59 8,75 7,25 
        
Notes. Critical values from Stock and Yogo (2001[2004], 40). Null hypothesis  is that 
instruments are weak, thus critical values less than test statistic indicate instrumentation is ―not 
weak‖. r is the maximum probability of wrongfully rejecting a null-hypothesis on the 
endogenous regressor using a Wald test at 5 percent level of significance. Critical values in 
bold are lower than test statistic and imply rejection of null. 
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The uncertainty around whether the endogeneity bias has been sufficiently accounted for 
points towards respecifying the regression model, rather than to continue with 
interpretation of the results reported. In this essay I restrict myself to commenting upon 
the specifications used by Hibbs and Locking (2000b) and I therefore turn to investigate 
the properties of the regressions based on their specification (1). That specification does 
not have the same endogeneity bias.  
 
3.4 Specification (1): possibly spurious results. 
 
The subject at hand in Hibbs and Locking (2000b) is to investigate whether there is a 
long term relationship between the consequence of an institutional arrangement, central 
wage bargaining, and an economic outcome, be that productivity or value added. The 
theory they refer to, most explicitly formulated in Moene and Wallerstein (1997), 
emphasise the long term nature of this relationship. In that model it is the steady state 
levels of productivity and output
5
 which are predicted to be positively associated with 
wage compression. Consequently, any empirical test of the effect of wage compression 
on economic outcome should be of such long term relationships, rather than of any 
systematic relationship between contemporaneous variables in a limited sample.  
 
In the following, I will use an approach of testing for cointegration as a test of such long 
term relationships in the data compiled by Hibbs and Locking. This mirrors the method 
used by Rodriguez (1999) in his investigation of the relationship between distributional 
skewness and redistributive policies in the US. He justifies this methodology by writing: 
 
―… the cointegration methodology is particularly well-suited to analyzing the validity of political 
theories, as political theories are fundamentally about long-run stable relationships.‖ (p. 179) 
 
                                                 
5
 For output this relationship is only predicted to be positive if bargaining strength is in a certain interval, as 
discussed in the theory section above. 
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In his case the theoretical reason for the relationship to be a long term one is that the 
voters’ trade-off between higher taxes and redistribution is reflected in the electoral 
process with cycles of several years, and the time from the launch of new policies until 
they are fully implemented and the results are felt is also a slow process. In the case of 
the effect of wage compression on economic outcomes, the reasoning behind the long 
term properties of the relationship is somewhat different, but the essence is the same: 
when you expect the relationship to be a long term one, the statistical test should also be 
one of long term association.  
 
An additional aspect making it essential to look at the long term properties is that a 
regression involving non-stationary variables may give rise to spurious results if the 
variables do not cointegrate (Granger and Newbold 1974). Interestingly, in the 
introduction to the article where this point was first made, Granger and Newbold (1974, 
111), the authors refer to a regression with characteristics which are comparable to, 
although somewhat more extreme than what one find from regressions using 
specification (1) of Hibbs and Locking (2000b). The regression in Granger and 
Newbold’s example has an R2 of 0.997 and a Durbin Watson statistic of 0.53. In their 
conclusion, Granger and Newbold (1974, 117) write, ―if a regression equation relating 
economic variables is found to have strongly autocorrelated residuals, equivalent to a low 
Durbin-Watson value, the only conclusion that can be reached is that the equation is mis-
specified, whatever the value of R2 observed‖ [italics in original].  
 
Specifications (1.1) through (1.4) of Hibbs and Locking have R
2’s ranging from 0.972 to 
0.988, Durbin Watson statistics which are in the inconclusive region
6
, and a Box Pierce 
Q-statistic which points to rejecting the null of no autocorrelation at the 2 percent level 
for specification (1.3) and (1.4), although not for specification (1.1) and (1.2) (see Table 
3 below). We see that the regression has a high R
2
 which may indicate spurious results 
and we cannot reject that the error terms are autocorrelated. In such a situation, a further 
                                                 
6
 With 5 regressors and 30 observations the inconclusive region of the Durbin Watson statistic is between 
1.07 and 1.83. With more regressors, as in (1.3) and (1.4)  the region is larger at both ends. 
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investigation of the time-series properties of the variables involved and the association 
between them is called for. To see if we may be dealing with a spurious regression, I will 
first investigate the stationarity of the variables, before I turn to checking for 
cointegration. 
3.4.1 Tests for non-stationarity 
 
There are theoretical reasons to expect that several of the variables in (1) are not 
stationary. First, value added yt, is theoretically a function of inputs and the technology 
with which these inputs are put together. Consequently, as long as the development of 
technology is not stationary around some deterministic trend, neither is output. 
Intuitively, there is no reason why technological development should have some 
mechanism moving it back to a deterministic growth path after a positive shock, which 
would have made it stationary around a deterministic trend. For instance, if productivity 
got a positive shock through the introduction of information and computer technology, 
there is no reason why it subsequently should have some years of particularly low 
growth, so that the long term effect of ICT vanishes. Rodriguez (1999, 177) sites that 
there is broad support for the view that income is in fact non-stationary.  
 
Second, there are arguments for pay inequality being both stationary and non-stationary. 
The measures of pay inequality used by Hibbs and Locking (2000b) are argued to be the 
Table 3.  
Specification (1): R
2
 and Autocorrelation in error term 
     
 
Normal 
inequality and 
one trend 
Log 
inequality 
and one 
trend 
Normal 
inequality and 
breaks in trend 
Log inequality 
and breaks in 
trend 
 (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) 
     
Adjusted R
2
 0.981 0.972 0.988 0.988 
Durbin Watson 1.35 1.26 1.36 1.32 
P-value of Box-Pierce Q 0.72 0.62 0.02 0.02 
Notes: Values reported in table 3, Hibbs and Locking (2000b, 772)   
 
  27   
  
outcomes of particular institutional arrangements in the labour market. In that case, for 
them to be stationary we must argue that there is some internal dynamic in these 
institutions which ensures that the institutional arrangements themselves either fluctuate 
back and forth in some systematic way or that there is some mechanism ensuring that 
once an institutional form has been established, it remains stable. There is much support 
for the latter in studies of the path-dependency of institutions (e.g. Engerman and 
Sokoloff 1997, Acemoglu et al 2001) indicating that a priori we might expect the pay 
inequality component caused by institutions to be stationary. The mechanism will then be 
that even if pay inequality is hit by a shock, e.g. due to the rapid advancement of one 
industrial sector over another, the stable institutions will ensure that over time this initial 
effect fades away. On the other hand, discussing the related variable distribution of 
household income, Rodriguez (1999) argues that there is even stronger reason to suspect 
non-stationarity here than for income discussed above. His argument is that this skewness 
is a function of relative prices of endowments which again ―are likely to be non-
stationary if they represent the effect of technological shocks and demand shocks to an 
economy which spends most of its time near equilibrium‖ (p. 177-178). To conclude, we 
cannot from theory be sure of the non-stationarity of pay inequality, and an empirical 
investigation is called for. 
 
Finally, capital and labour in our dataset are more driven by the declining share of 
manufacturing and mining in the economy as a whole than by some internal dynamic. 
However, the two may have a stable relationship between themselves, an argument 
indicating that the two variables cointegrate. In the Solow model, stable K/L is the very 
definition of steady state. If we add exogenous technological growth, then steady state K 
will grow at some deterministic rate, still ensuring a cointegrating relationship between K 
and L. So even if we find that the natural logarithms of these two variables in our dataset, 
k and l, respectively are non-stationary, a linear combination of the two may still be 
stationary. The model economy used to derive predictions on the link between inequality 
and growth in Moene and Wallerstein (1997) does not give much indication of the nature 
of this relationship, since the capital labour ratio is simply assumed to be fixed.  
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The data of Hibbs and Locking indicate, as shown in Table 4, that most of the variables 
in specification (1) are non-stationary, with the exception of log manufacturing labour, 
log capital and inequality between sectors, which give more mixed results. 
 
Both for the substantive discussion of a long term relationship, and for giving us 
indication of the validity of our statistical tests of stationarity, a closer investigation of 
each variable’s time-series properties is of use. First, looking more closely at the log of 
manufacturing value added, y, we see in the upper left part of Figure 5 below that the 
variable does not seem to be stationary around any given level, and it is difficult to say if 
it is stationary around some deterministic trend. The autocorrelation plot of y provided in 
the upper right corner shows that past values of y as far back as 5 years seem to have a 
statistically significant effect on its current level. For variables that are stationary around 
some trend, this lag is expected to be short, while for a non-stationary series all past 
values will influence the current level, so the graphical investigation of the level of y does 
 Table 4 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test of non-stationarity on variables in 
specification (1) 
      
 ADF test statistic   
  Drift included   
Drift and 
trend included   
Is variable 
likely  
stationary? 
      
Ln (Value added) -2.086  -2.024  No 
Ln (Capital) -2.612  -2.380  Mixed
¤
 
Ln (Labour) 0.235  -3.675*  Mixed 
Inequality between sectors -3.464*  -0.203  Mixed 
Inequality within sectors -1.790  -1.825  No 
Ln (Inequality between sectors) -2.109  0.306  No 
Ln (Inequality within sectors) -1.773  -2.220  No 
            
Notes. Number of lags chosen with AIC-criterion as recommended by Patterson (2000, 
239). * rejection of non-stationarity at 5 percent level. ** rejection of non-stationarity at 
1 percent level.  
¤ 
Conclusion on stationarity refers to the time-series property of the level variables and 
is  based on results in this table as well as the graphical analysis presented below. 
 
  29   
  
not give a clear reason to reject the hypothesis of y being non-stationary. Turning to the 
growth rate of Y, which is the difference of y between two periods, we see that also this 
has a persistent deviation from some average value, but looking at the autocorrelation 
plot does not indicate a similar persistence in the influence of lagged values as for the 
level of y. Combining this graphical analysis with the theoretical considerations on the 
properties of value added and the analytical results in Table 4 above, it seems reasonable 
to assume that value added in this dataset is non-stationary.  
 
Turning to the log of Real Capital adjusted for Capital Utilisation, k, the most striking 
aspect which we see in Figure 6 below are the large fluctuations the variable exhibits – 
which is not expected from a stock variable such as real capital. This is due to the fact 
that Hibbs and Locking’s variable k is the stock of real capital adjusted for capital 
utilisation, so that k = Ln(K_real * CapitalUtil). While K_real is a smooth stock 
variable, CapitalUtil can be seen as a flow variable depending on the business cycle and 
short term decisions at firm level. The very low levels for this variable in the early 90s 
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Figure 5. Time-series property of manufacturing value added, y 
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may for instance probably be attributed to the shock to the economy from its monetary 
crisis at that time. The result is that also k gets the properties of a flow variable. 
Nevertheless, as long as capital utilization fluctuates around some stable level and is 
stationary, the variable k should have the same long term time series properties as k_real. 
 
A graphical analysis of this k in Figure 7 shows us that although there is some 
autocorrelation, the effect of past variation soon fades out. For the rate of change in K, 
denoted Dk in Figure 7 below, this is even clearer. The analytical test of non-stationarity 
reported in Table 4 indicates that the series is non-stationary, but this result depends on 
the number of lags chosen. I chose according to the AIC criterion giving its highest value 
for including 4 lags in the augmented Dickey Fuller test. Had I chosen the number of lags 
based on the general to specific method of keeping the longest lag which was partially 
statistically significant in the ADF-regression, I would have included only one lag, and 
the t-statistic for the ADF-test on k is then -3.725 which is statistically different from zero 
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Figure 6. The time series of real capital stock (k_real), capital utilisation (CapitalUtil) and real 
capital stock adjusted for capital utilization (k). Sweden 1963-1993. 
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at the 1 percent level using the critical values for this test. This points towards k being 
stationary. To conclude, the results on the time-series properties of k are mixed. 
. 
 
If we look at the log of manufacturing labour, l, we also get a mixed result which depends 
on whether we add a deterministic trend in the ADF-regression. A look at the graphical 
results points towards the variable being non-stationary where we see the persistence of 
the lags in influencing the value. This may however reflect a certain rigidity in the labour 
market, as also discussed by Hibbs and Locking (2000b, 770-771), where the short term 
properties of the time series may differ from a long term equilibrium. For instance, even 
if there is a downwards trend in manufacturing labour, if current labour is above its trend, 
the adjustment to trend may take many years due to long labour contracts or other costs 
associated with adjustment. 
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Figure 7. Time-series properties of real capital adjusted for capital utilisation, k 
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I finally turn to the time series of pay inequality, both within and between sectors, and on 
normal and log form. For the normal form the graphical results are presented below in 
Figures 9 and 10, where CVB is the weighted coefficient of variation of pay between 
sectors, while CVW is the weighted coefficient of variation of pay within sectors. We see 
a clear downward trend towards the end of the 1970s, followed by a more stable period, 
and an upward tendency towards the end of the 1980s through to the end of the time 
series. Moene and Wallerstein (1997) simplifies by saying that in steady state collective 
bargaining can be represented as average wage being similar across all sectors. The data 
on CVB below may conform to this view if we assume that as collective bargaining was 
introduced in 1956 (Hibbs and Locking 2000b, 759) a transition to a new steady state 
level of very low wage inequality between sectors was initiated. This process seems to 
have ended by the late 1970s, several years before the institution of collective bargaining  
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Figure 8. Time-series properties of manufacturing labour, l 
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Figure 9. Time-series properties of pay inequality across sectors, CVB 
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Figure 10. Time-series properties of pay inequality within sectors, CVW 
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started to fall apart in 1982. This is consistent with the theoretical discussion of pay 
inequality being a stationary time-series. Nevertheless, for the purpose of statistical tests 
on this sample, the time series properties of the data at hand are relevant. Then, a 
graphical analysis combined with the analytical results above indicates that both CVB and 
CVW are non-stationary variables in this particular data set. 
 
The results are quite similar for the logarithmic versions of CVB and CVW, which we see 
from Figure 11. For cvw the results are comparable while for cvb we see that the normal 
version seems to be integrated of the second degree, I(2), while the logarithmic version 
seems to have the properties of an I(1)-series. This may indicate that the functional form 
of CVB is convex, which is then linearlized by taking the log. The convex property may 
be a result of the time sample at hand which captures what may have been the transition 
from one stable level of inequality to another lower level. In that case the series may be 
stationary around a level, but undergoing a structural break at the beginning of the period 
we are looking at initiating a transition to a new stable level which is reached around the 
mid 1970s, as discussed above. Regardless, in the sample at hand both the variables cvb 
and cvw seem to have the properties of non-stationary series. 
 
 
To conclude this section on the time series properties of the variables in specification (1), 
we see that there are non-stationary variables on both sides of the equation, which may 
then give rise to spurious results if the variables do not cointegrate. Consequently, if the 
variables in specification (1) do not cointegrate, the results reported as statistically 
significant in table 3 in Hibbs and Locking (2000b, 773) may in fact simply be the results 
of spurious regressions. In order to investigate this possibility, I now turn to a formal test 
of non-cointegration.  
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3.4.2 Cointegration test 
 
A test of cointegration is a test of whether there is a long term relationship between time 
series. The null hypothesis of no-cointegration is then the same as a null hypothesis of no 
such long term relationship, and a rejection of this null-hypothesis can consequently be 
interpreted as empirical support of a long term relationship.  
 
Along the lines of Rodriguez (1999) we need to substantiate that there is a long run stable 
relationship between the variables in (1) for that specification to be valid, in which case 
we can proceed to make inference from the initial regression. Rodriguez (1999) uses the 
Engle Granger test of no cointegration as well as the Johansen test. He shows, through 
the use of Monte Carlo simulations, that the Johansen test has poor small sample 
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Figure 11. Time-series properties of logarithm of measures of inequality cvb and cvw 
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properties, simulating on a sample of the seme length as his own with 45 observations 
running from 1947 to 1992. The sample for Sweden is even shorter, with 30 observations 
running from 1964-1993, which motivates the choice of just focusing on the Engle 
Granger test of no cointegration. 
 
The Engle Granger test of no cointegration is a two step procedure. First it consists of 
running an OLS-regression of the specification in question, in this case (1), and saving 
the residuals. The second stage is to test the residuals for stationarity in a test similar to 
the Augmented Dickey Fuller test. However, the ADF regression does not include a 
constant, and we apply a particular set of critical values when evaluating the t-statistics. If 
non-stationarity cannot be rejected, this is an indication of no cointegration. In other 
words, if non-stationarity of the residual is rejected, then that means that the data supports 
the alternative hypothesis of cointegration, in which case we may interpret the 
coefficients of the initial OLS-regression without fearing that they are spurious results.  
 
The critical values are given by the MacKinnon response surface with the following 
specification 
(5) 221 //),( TTTC     
 
where T is the number of observations, and the  -constants are tabulated from Monte 
Carlo simulations and depend on   as well as the number of regressors (Patterson 
2000,333-334). Specifications (1.1) and (1.2), as shown below, both have 5 regressors 
including the trend, but not counting the constant. In the table of  -values in Patterson 
(2000,372) this is the maximum number of regressors for which   is tabulated, and the 
critical values are then as shown in Panel B of Table 6 below. These critical values are 
decreasing (i.e. become more negative) as the number of regressors goes up, so we know 
that for specifications (1.3) and (1.4) the critical values are at least more negative than the 
ones we see in Panel B of Table 6 below. 
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When performing the test of cointegration, I first ran the OLS-regression based on the 
four different specifications of model (1) which are reported in Table 3, p. 772 in Hibbs 
and Locking (2000b). I call the first column there (1.1), the second (1.2) etc. The 
variables included are summed up in Table 5. The results from my OLS-regression were 
identical to those reported by Hibbs and Locking (2000b) when it comes to the point 
estimates of the coefficients, ensuring that the error term I have are the same that Hibbs 
and Locking must have gotten in their estimation. The standard errors of the coefficients 
on the other hand, were slightly different. This is owing to the fact that I did not manage 
to identify exactly the type of robust estimator they used for their regression. In the 
working paper (Hibbs and Locking 2000a) they write that they used ―OLS with robust 
errors (White 1980)‖ (p.25), but experimentation with various robust estimation 
commands in Stata have not yielded identical results. This does not, however, cast any 
additional uncertainty on the following test of cointegration because this test focuses on 
the characteristics of the residual which is a function of the point estimates alone.  
Table 5  
Regressions of Ln (Value Added) with specification (1). Overview of variables. 
     
 
Normal 
inequality and 
one trend 
Log inequality 
and one trend 
Normal 
inequality and 
breaks in trend 
Log inequality 
and breaks in 
trend 
 (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) 
     
Inequality Between Sectors x  x  
Inequality Within Sectors x  x  
Ln (Inequality Between Sectors)  x  x 
Ln (Inequality Within Sectors)  x  x 
Ln (Real Capital) x x x x 
Ln (Manufacturing Labour) x x x x 
Trend x x x x 
Trend1972-82   x x 
Trend1983-93   x x 
Dummy1983-93     x x 
     
Number of variables 5 5 8 8 
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The Engle Granger test of cointegration on the residuals from the regressions (1.1) 
through (1.4) all failed to reject the null of no cointegration, as reported in Panel A of 
Table 6 below. This indicates that data does not support that there exists a long run stable 
relationship between the variables involved. 
To sum up, this section on cointegration gives no evidence from data that there is a long 
run stable relationship between value added and the two types of inequality, when 
accounting for the trend, capital and labour. In the absence of support for such a long run 
relationship, making inference based on the OLS-estimates is misleading. Moreover, we 
are investigating the presence of a relationship which is thought a priori to be of a long 
run nature, and the failure to identify such a relationship in data, which the failure to 
reject the null of no-cointegration amounts to, is an answer to the initial question we 
asked, and the analysis can end at this point.  
Table 6 
Test of cointegration in equations (1.1) - (1.4) 
     
Panel A: Engle Granger test of non-cointegration on residuals  
     
 
Normal 
inequality 
and one trend 
Log 
inequality 
and one trend 
Normal 
inequality and 
breaks in trend 
Log inequality 
and breaks in 
trend 
 (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) 
     
ADF-statistic -3.866 -4.253 -4.109 -3.654 
Number of regressors 5 5 8 8 
     
Panel B: Critical values for the Engle Granger test of non-cointegration 
(For 29 observations and 5 regressors.) 
     
 Level of significance  
 0.01 0.05 0.10  
     
Critical value -5.41 -4.86 -4.42  
     
Notes. Number of lags chosen with AIC-criterion as recommended  
by Patterson (2000, 239).  
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4 Conclusion 
 
This paper points towards being cautious when using the results reported by Hibbs and 
Locking (2000b) as empirical support of a positive impact of wage compression on 
productivity and output. The method applied has been to re-estimate and re-examine the 
results reported by Hibbs and Locking using the original data set. 
 
First, the instrument set used to account for the endogeneity bias in the specification of 
wage structure on labour productivity does not pass formal tests for weak instruments. In 
that specification, value added is an endogenous regressor as it enters in the numerator of 
the dependent variable, labour productivity. In an OLS-regression this will yield biased 
estimators not only of the endogenous regressor, but of all the regressors, making 
inference from the OLS-results misleading. It is therefore essential to be sure that an 
instrumentation removes this endogeneity. This does not seem to be the case in the data 
set used by Hibbs and Locking (2000b). The Sargan test of over-identification cannot 
reject the hypothesis of the instruments being correlated with the error term for two out of 
four versions of the productivity-model, and the test proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005) 
cannot reject that the instruments are weak for either of the specifications. In conclusion, 
doubt remains as to whether the instrumentation accounts for the endogeneity bias in the 
original regression model. If such a bias remains, also our our coefficients of interest will 
have a bias, making inference misleading. This points towards respecifying the model, 
rather than to continue with interpretation of the results.  
 
Second, when turning to the specification used to investigate the effect from wage 
structure on manufacturing value added, there does not seem to be support for any stable 
long term relationship between the variables. By looking at the time-series properties of 
the variables involved, data gives support for several of them being non-stationary. 
Regressions involving non-stationary variables may give spurious results, yielding 
statistically significant coefficients more often than the level of significance of the test. 
This is true unless the variables cointegrate. When testing for cointegration, the Engle 
Granger test does not support the rejection of the null hypothesis that the variables do not 
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cointegrate. Consequently, inference from the OLS-estimates may be misleading since 
these results may be spurious. Moreover, the test of cointegration is a more direct test of 
the long term relationship between the variables which is predicted from theory. To sum 
up, neither of the specifications used in Hibbs and Locking (2000b) passes formal tests 
which would have substantiated the results they report. 
 
The findings in this paper do not in any way provide evidence against the theory that 
wage compression may have influenced, or indeed been a key influence on, economic 
performance in Sweden. All that it does is to indicate that the paper by Hibbs and 
Locking (2000b) does not seem to provide convincing evidence in favour of this theory. 
Given that the paper by Hibbs and Locking seems to be the only empirical investigation 
of this link, this point to the need for more empirical research in this field. The challenge 
will be to get data sets which are large enough and appropriate to investigate testable 
implications from the many theories of links between wage structure and economic 
performance, as well as from the many other theories of what has been the key to the 
Nordic success. 
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Appendix 1. Data on Wage dispersion and economic indicators. Manufacturing and Mining, Sweden 1963-1993 
Dataset compiled by Douglas Hibbs and Håkan Locking for Hibbs, Douglas, and Håkan Locking (2000b): “Wage Dispersion and Productive Efficiency: Evidence for Sweden.”  
Journal of Labor Economics 18, No. 4. 
               
Year  
Nominal 
wage, 
ISIC 2 + 3 
Producer 
tax rate 
Nominal 
OECD 
imports, US 
$ 
Import price 
index 
SEK / US 
$ 
Value 
added, ISIC 
2+3 
Labour, ISIC 
2+3 
Producer 
price, ISIC 
2+3 
Coeff. of var 
between 
sectors 
Coeff. of 
var within 
sectors 
Real user 
price of 
capital 
Real stock 
of capital 
Capital 
utilisation 
  w_nom t imp_nom p_imp sekdollar y l p cvb cvw3 r k_real capitalutil 
1963  7.2900 0.066 106.3 23.70000 5.1732 101709.6 1320312.0 32.43750 0.0226882 0.0425573 0.1186625 158490.1  
1964  7.9400 0.074 119.7 24.31243 5.1732 110951.1 1367738.0 33.57450 0.0228844 0.0412634 0.1382850 171356.7 54.00 
1965  8.7825 0.078 131.3 24.53245 5.1732 118845.1 1363820.0 34.49800 0.0229826 0.0404165 0.1315275 182445.3 57.75 
1966  9.4600 0.082 145.3 24.97250 5.1732 122038.8 1340421.0 35.11625 0.0196961 0.0388276 0.1193725 195039.5 46.25 
1967  10.4000 0.097 152.7 24.75248 5.1732 126077.1 1260456.0 35.18800 0.0164096 0.0376145 0.1141400 208243.8 36.50 
1968  11.0750 0.101 171.6 24.53245 5.1732 132816.7 1180454.0 35.61300 0.0157693 0.0364287 0.1131675 221113.6 35.00 
1969  12.2000 0.117 197.2 25.19252 5.1732 143489.4 1174166.0 36.98600 0.0151290 0.0346297 0.1234725 232733.3 55.50 
1970  13.6375 0.125 227.0 26.18262 5.1732 152014.1 1173682.0 39.61575 0.0114490 0.0325805 0.1276975 245676.6 57.25 
1971  15.0025 0.139 252.3 27.83278 5.1168 153520.8 1098592.0 40.42150 0.0091690 0.0310822 0.0994750 258509.2 36.00 
1972  16.6625 0.145 300.3 30.14301 4.7624 154271.7 1020247.0 42.48400 0.0068890 0.0295840 0.1028825 271784.1 32.25 
1973  18.1200 0.181 412.8 37.18372 4.3673 165527.8 1017438.0 47.65275 0.0068203 0.0277209 0.1252575 285107.0 41.50 
1974  20.4175 0.241 589.1 52.14521 4.4394 174090.9 1114594.0 58.91550 0.0068066 0.0241231 0.1268525 300652.7 52.25 
1975  24.3025 0.287 589.1 56.98570 4.1522 173314.5 1084173.0 63.81525 0.0057877 0.0204933 0.1078400 318089.1 34.00 
1976  27.2650 0.327 680.3 57.64576 4.3559 173188.0 1043365.0 69.13400 0.0047687 0.0168636 0.0988275 334356.3 27.75 
1977  29.1850 0.371 770.2 63.03630 4.4816 162746.0 982424.0 74.78050 0.0050700 0.0156179 0.0925325 348331.3 20.00 
1978  33.3575 0.361 890.7 69.08691 4.5185 157631.3 912758.0 79.73975 0.0053713 0.0143722 0.1010200 355180.9 21.00 
1979  36.2300 0.367 1142.7 81.95820 4.2871 168735.4 908293.0 88.22375 0.0052623 0.0140034 0.1499825 357730.2 33.50 
1980  39.7700 0.378 1370.2 100.00000 4.2296 169301.0 884802.0 100.00000 0.0055339 0.0133672 0.1250325 362557.1 37.25 
1981  43.7250 0.385 1301.5 97.24973 5.0634 164389.0 855880.0 110.00350 0.0058055 0.0127311 0.0970450 369842.6 21.75 
1982  46.8000 0.387 1220.5 92.29923 6.2826 164297.0 821839.0 123.29920 0.0048957 0.0121176 0.1052075 373049.9 16.50 
1983  48.5250 0.420 1199.5 87.45875 7.6671 173566.0 795482.0 136.80250 0.0048147 0.0121935 0.1106600 372767.4 24.75 
1984  53.5650 0.421 1310.2 85.25853 8.2718 186711.0 819749.0 148.78320 0.0048262 0.0127311 0.1535775 375400.6 39.50 
1985  58.8475 0.423 1358.0 83.82838 8.6039 190438.0 803110.0 157.01920 0.0044532 0.0132803 0.1582675 383823.3 43.00 
1986  62.9200 0.423 1529.2 87.78878 7.1236 192781.0 791077.0 160.27470 0.0047116 0.0146207 0.1343450 394231.9 42.75 
1987  67.8350 0.432 1829.5 97.13972 6.3404 197418.0 795474.0 165.23570 0.0046775 0.0144548 0.1611450 405669.1 46.75 
1988  72.1625 0.432 2067.7 99.22992 6.1272 203185.0 793749.0 175.90530 0.0055677 0.0151241 0.1273900 420608.9 54.25 
1989  79.5175 0.440 2238.3 100.11000 6.4469 205175.0 793335.0 190.30410 0.0058562 0.0182304 0.1348850 436064.2 50.50 
1990  87.5425 0.429 2570.8 110.01100 5.9188 203983.0 762555.0 198.10350 0.0073797 0.0173133 0.1244575 453557.6 35.00 
1991  93.0325 0.448 2591.2 108.03080 6.0475 194348.0 685286.9 199.85090 0.0075518 0.0188865 0.1462100 464848.3 17.00 
1992  98.5925 0.415 2703.7 109.13090 5.8238 188473.0 618487.2 197.90100 0.0085342 0.0165976 0.1519570 469088.0 15.00 
1993   102.6950 0.376 2637.9 101.54020 7.7834 194673.0 580415.6 208.79040 0.0084814 0.0169541 0.0723750 460175.3 15.75 
Notes. Provided courtesy of Håkan Locking. For sources, see chapter 3.1 "Data" in main text       
Appendix 2. Do-file for Stata estimations.  
use SwedenDataStata 
 
* create variables of interest for the estimation 
tsset year, yearly 
gen y_ln = ln(y) 
gen l_ln = ln(l) 
gen w = (w_nom * (1+t)) * (100/p) 
gen k = k_real * (capitalutil/100) 
gen k_ln = ln(k) 
gen l_ln_1 = l_ln[_n-1] 
gen prod_ln = y_ln - l_ln 
gen w_ln = ln(w) 
gen r_ln = ln(r) 
gen imp = imp_nom * sekdollar * (100/p_imp) 
gen imp_ln = ln(imp) 
gen cvb_ln = ln(cvb) 
gen cvw3_ln = ln(cvw3) 
gen y_ln_1 = y_ln[_n-1] 
 
********************* 
* Do the estimations from hibbs and locking (2000) 
******************** 
 
* regression of specification (1.1) 
regress y_ln cvb cvw3 l_ln k_ln trend, robust 
 
* regression of specification (1.2) 
regress y_ln cvb_ln cvw3_ln l_ln k_ln trend, robust 
 
* regression of specification (1.3) 
regress y_ln dummy83_93 cvb cvw3 l_ln k_ln trend trend70_82 trend83_93, robust 
 
* regression of specification (1.4) 
regress y_ln dummy83_93 cvb_ln cvw3_ln l_ln k_ln trend trend70_82 trend83_93, 
robust 
 
* regression of specification (2.1) 
ivreg prod_ln (y_ln = imp_ln y_ln_1)  cvb cvw3 r_ln w_ln  l_ln_1 trend, first 
robust 
 
* regression of specification (2.2) 
ivreg prod_ln (y_ln = imp_ln y_ln_1)  cvb_ln cvw3_ln r_ln w_ln  l_ln_1 trend, 
first robust 
 
* regression of specification (2.3) 
ivreg prod_ln (y_ln = imp_ln y_ln_1)  dummy83_93 cvb cvw3 r_ln w_ln  l_ln_1 
trend trend70_82 trend83_93, first robust 
 
* regression of specification (2.4) 
ivreg prod_ln (y_ln = imp_ln y_ln_1)  dummy83_93 cvb_ln cvw3_ln r_ln w_ln  
l_ln_1 trend trend70_82 trend83_93, first robust 
 
* additional statistics on 1st stage was found running “ivreg2” on (2.1)-(2-4) 
